But if we view these laws as literally true, it that would mean the ideal entities literally enter into causal relations and occupy space-time. Lewis thus calls the view “non-descript” Ersatzism, complaining that the theory is not much of a theory at all. In some contexts ‘It is possible for me to be a dentist’ (uttered by you) is true in virtue of a non-actual dentist that, say, merely looks like you. There is a further concern about the metaphysics of the atoms. Daniel Garber, University of Chicago Book Description. Are there such things as merely possible people, who would have lived if our ancestors had acted differently? Many philosophers follow Kripke (1972) in holding that at least some individuals have essential properties, properties that they necessarily exhibit. If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? But in what sense “determines?” This would seem to concern the micro-facts metaphysically necessitating the macro-facts in a world. These are statements about what is possible or what is necessarily so. Lewis suggests that the pictures would be representative, specifically, by isomorphism, by a mirroring between parts of the picture and parts of what is represented. It already appears in one of his earliest published papers (Lewis 1968). (In contrast, circularity is a recurring problem for Lewis’ competitors, as we shall see.) He just utilized the sets as they were, referring to them as “state descriptions.” Still, posterior to Kripke’s modal logic, one might naturally assimilate state descriptions to ersatz worlds, since state descriptions fulfill the semantic role that is otherwise played by worlds. In Kant's Modal Metaphysics Nicholas Stang examines Kant's lifelong engagement with these questions and their role in his philosophical development. Thus, a splotch of the picture would be isomorphic to the cat by having the very same shape and the very same color as the cat. (In contrast, Sententialism can explain the representational nature of its ersatz worlds by the representational nature of sentences.). Regardless, if we are presently unable to define these notions adequately, it does not follow that we will never be able to. As Lewis is aware, the most glaring issue is that the view just ignores the Principle of Parsimony, which demands that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. de Rosset, L. (2009a). A separate obstacle for Fictionalism is that Lewis is agnostic on certain modal matters, for example, the possible sizes of space-time. He grants, however, that we may consider particulars and properties/relations in abstraction from states-of-affairs. Even if we ignore cases where Lewis is agnostic, the PWF will have gaps since it does not explicitly list every modal statement. an example of extreme metaphysics. Of course, not everyone is happy with Armstrong’s picture. Lewis responded by explaining modal knowledge via “imaginative tests,” where we judge whether an imaginary scenario is possible using the Principle of Recombination. Still, the claim that the plentitude of worlds genuinely exists seems ridiculously, outrageously implausible by commonsense standards. According to Sententialism, then, truth or falsity of a sentence “Possibly, p” is ultimately a matter of whether some maximally consistent set contains the sentence “p” as a member. Even so, Lewis replies that the Ersatzer should still provide individuation-conditions for alien properties. (But, note that a concrete world can be home to abstract objects all the same.) After all, on her view, what Lewis’ Recombination Principle says (in conjunction with the rest of Lewis’ view) wholly determines what is possible. Different writers take different entities as their ersatz worlds, but the common idea is to use objects that are just plain actual, thus avoiding a Realist commitment to non-actuals. After all, we already believe in the actual world, and Lewis is merely asking us to believe in more entities of that kind. His reply is that for the most part, our modal knowledge follows from our (tacit) knowledge of the Recombination Principle. Yet it is unclear whether this is satisfactory, since numbers do not literally represent anything (much less represent nonactual matter); hence, the numbers will apparently be chosen arbitrarily. Consequently, the view entails that it is possible (say) for Bertrand Russell to be a poached egg—though the current philosophical trends at the beginning of the 21st century are against such a thing. Yet for Lewis, there is no causal interaction between us and other worlds, and so knowledge of other worlds looks problematic. cit., p. 86). In the main article on Leibniz, it was claimed that Leibniz's philosophy can be seen as a reaction to the Cartesian theory of corporeal substance and the necessitarianism of Spinoza and Hobbes. Leibnizs Metaphysics of Time and Space. Note that even if the ersatz worlds are ontologically basic, they can nonetheless have structure. Yet as we saw, the standard theory of properties would only create circularity in the Ersatzer’s account. So the Sententialist apparently takes as given one of the notions it wants to explicate. Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad. And indeed, the most important figure in modal metaphysics—David Lewi… In utilizing maximally consistent sets, the Sententialist account depends on the modal notion of “consistency.” And unlike Lewis, the Sententialist cannot try to eliminate this notion by instead depending on robust facts about concrete possible worlds. Imagine first a non-existent bald man in a doorway, and then imagine a non-existent fat man in the doorway. Lewis (1973), however, distinguishes so-called quantitative parsimony from qualitative parsimony. (Technical aside: Lewis thinks there is nothing strange here if we think of a counterpart as a “deferred referent.”) Regardless, let us now turn to criticisms of Lewis’ Realism itself. Contains some historically important criticisms of Lewis’ Realism. Lycan’s point is that it does not, given that the theory rests on the distinction between “possible” and “impossible” worlds. Still, Quine’s views are radically at odds with the current philosophical orthodoxies, and so many philosophers remain unconvinced. Since PWF is a fiction, the claims it makes are false—yet is the PWF contingently or necessarily false? So, this article reviews five kinds of answer to the question about possible worlds: (1) Meinong’s Realism, (2) David Lewis’ Realism, (3) Ersatzism, (4) Fictionalism, and (5) David Armstrong’s hybrid of (3) and (4). Nonetheless, if we follow Kripke’s logic to the letter, the statement “It is possible for me to be a dentist” is true (if uttered by you), in virtue of some alternate world where you yourself exist and are a dentist. Contains the slogan “There are objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects.” One of the few pieces by Meinong widely available in English. Kripke (1972) suggests that there is a tendency to conflate notions of analyticity, necessity, and the a priori. But this is misleading. That seems true enough. A sustained defense of Lewis’ Realism, and an attack on the alternative, Ersatz views. Admittedly, however, it is hard to see how immaterial objects could be composed of “atoms,” much less the same type of “atoms” as material objects. Yet the reader can verify that Lewis’ Realism, Ersatzism, Fictionalism, the Armstrong Hybrid, and Conventionalism face circularity worries; each seems to implicitly deploy a modal notion in the analysis of modal notions. Still, many assume that Kripke’s aposteriori necessities are also synthetic truths. For another, the view naturally extends the commonsense semantics of ordinary names to empty names such as ‘Pegasus.’ Unlike the descriptivist, say, the Meinongian simply regards ‘Pegasus’ labeling an object (albeit a non-existing one), just in the way that people commonly regard ‘Tony Blair’ as a label for a person. Yet it was Creswell 1972 who first accepted and defended the view. A different issue that Lewis acknowledges concerns the epistemology of worlds. Now the Combinatorialist may simply bite the bullet here; after all, the fact that people believe in spiritual entities does not show their possibility (although, if propositions are sets of worlds, then it is harder to characterize those beliefs without worlds containing such entities). (Note that there are other ways to construe ‘abstract,’ but Lewis finds these no better. The view has roots in the Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, but interestingly it was Quine, our modal skeptic, who first developed it in some detail. Quine, W. V. (1936). This is obvious enough if propositions are identified with linguistic (or mental) sentence-types. Abstract. So in some epistemic sense, it is true that Armstrong recombines particulars and their properties/relations, similar to other Combinatorialists. A more robust kind of Realism, however, is expounded by David Lewis (1969; 1973; 1986). Second, the abstract/concrete distinction sometimes concerns whether an object has spatio-temporal dimensions. The first defense of a Combinatorialist view akin to that of Quine (1968). The Meinongian seems to lack the resources to determine a fact of the matter. But the issue is whether Lewis’ theory understands modal talk in completely nonmodal terms. Catherine Wilson examines the shifts in Leibniz’s thinking as he confronted the major philosophical problems of his era. So once again, our analysis of possible worlds seems to use one of the modal notions it was supposed to explicate. The idea is that talk of “possible worlds” is too useful to modal semantics to see it as a mere façon de parler (way of speaking). Although Lewis accepts Kripke’s way of characterizing worlds, it is ultimately unnecessary to his metaphysics. A second advantage is that the Fictionalist does not have the same troubles with the epistemology of worlds. Although the philosophical systems of G. W. Leibniz and David Lewis both feature possible worlds, the ways in which their systems are similar and dissimilar are ultimately surprising. This work presents Leibnizs subtle approach to possibility and explores some of its consequential repercussions in his metaphysics… Provides the first developed version of Combinatorialism, though Quine ultimately rejects the view. A standard sort of semantics would say that a statement of the form “According to the PWF, p” means “In a possible world where the PWF is true, p.” Yet if the Fictionalist analyzes possible-worlds statements in terms of story-prefixed statements, she cannot also analyze the latter in terms of the former, on pain of circularity. Meinong’s Realism, also called Meinongian Realism, is the contemporary Meinongian view which starts with Kripke’s possible worlds and attempts to make metaphysical sense of non-actual worlds and their denizens. Since the Fictionalist is not a Realist, she cannot say that the right fiction is the one that corresponds to the real possible worlds. Quine protested that Meinongian objects have no clear individuation-conditions. However, Quine protests that our definition of synonymy cannot rest on the notion of necessity, for otherwise we will have gone in a small definitional circle. In contrast, Meinongian Realism increases the kinds that entities exist. And as Lewis admits, it is counter-intuitive to say that. Nonetheless, the Fictionalist strategy has garnered a lot of attention, since at the least, it may be no more problematic than the Ersatz views. For instance, simply as a logical point, it has the strange consequence that “Necessarily, I am myself” is true only in virtue of objects that are neither identical to me nor to one another. In the main, the paper concerns whether the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ can be properly defined, even provided the stock examples of analytic statements, for example, ‘Bachelors are unmarried men.’ Yet Quine’s investigation bears on modal terms as well, since he presumes that a statement would be analytic if and only if it is necessary. Infamously, Meinong once expressed this in the slogan “there are objects such that it is true to say of them that there are no such objects” (1904, p. 83). In contrast, Lewis believes he has no need to answer this since he can just let the concrete modal facts fall where they may. In the hard sciences, moreover, if an unobservable entity is theoretically useful, that is often seen as a reason to think it exists. Lewis even suggests it compatible with reducing possible states-of-affairs to sets of Lewisian concrete worlds (if the sets are actual abstracta). So at best, the result is a rather tight circle of definitions. After all, besides implying that some ersatz world “corresponds” to our world, the Ersatzers generally speak of what is true “according to a world.” Nevertheless, Ersatzers diverge on which actual representational objects should be the world-surrogate. After all, intuitively, what is possible for me does not depend on facts about any “maximal objects” that exist; it is not as if facts about these spatiotemporally removed objects are what make it possible for me to be a dentist. If so, then unlike the Property Ersatzer, the Pictorial Ersatzer could meet Lewis’ demand to individuate alien properties. So oddly, even though alternate worlds exist just as much as we do, they do not exist anywhere in relation to us. Leibniz's Modal Metaphysics [PDF Preview] This PDF version matches the latest version of this entry. On a different note, the Combinatorialist should be concerned that her worlds only contain matter. On a related matter, the Fictionalist seems to face a dilemma. ', or more completely 'What exists, what is Reality?'. But as noted in Lycan (1994), an Ersatzer can instead follow Parsons (1980), who individuates objects in terms of properties. The Discourse on Metaphysics is one of Leibnizs fundamental works. On this line, once all the obfuscation is cleared away, Meinong is committed to the absurdity that non-existents exist. So it seems that for the Fictionalist, some modal truths are true because they are entailed by the PWF. Objects from different worlds cannot co-exist, since Lewis presumes that worlds cannot “overlap” in any way. Quine, this would hardly come as a surprise. Are there future people, who have not yet been conceived? But if not, how do we acquire modal knowledge? In similar fashion, “Necessarily, p” is true or false depending on whether all such sets contain “p.” Naturally, such a view requires an ontological commitment to sets, but such abstract objects might be required anyway (perhaps due to Quine-Putnam indispensability arguments). And a commitment to sets and the like may not seem quite as objectionable as a Realist’s commitment to nonactual objects. Leibniz's Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development will not be ignored; it will be read and passionately debated for years to come." Leibniz's modal metaphysics. A number of objections have been raised against Quine. (‘Ersatz’ is German for ‘replacement’ or ‘substitute.’) Thus the truth or falsity of a modal statement is explained by appeal to surrogates or proxies for possible worlds, rather than to genuinely existing worlds themselves. On this, Lewis considers a “Pictorial Ersatzer,” an Ersatzer who holds that all possible properties (including alien properties) are actually instantiated on abstract pictures. There is one final objection to Lewis we should note. Alvin Plantinga is an American philosopher, currently the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. So regardless of whether Quine or the conventionalist is right, the primary lesson of this section stands, namely, that metaphysical accounts of possible worlds might be mistaken not just in detail, but in their most basic assumptions. A traditional definition of analyticity (from Kant) is dismissed as metaphorical, since it simply says that in an analytic statement, the predicate is “contained” in the subject. Also, it is cited when accusing Quine of conflating analyticity, necessity, and the. Plus, it can be applied to other problematic objects besides possible worlds, “moral facts” for example. He grants that his Realism may well violate quantitative parsimony, given the number of entities in his ontology, yet he suggests it is only qualitative parsimony that really matters. Indeed, many have said that Lewis should admit impossible worlds anyway, for the same kind of indispensability reasons in favor of possible worlds. The reason is that Armstrong sees states-of-affairs as more ontologically basic than particulars and their properties/relations, since those have no existence apart from states-of-affairs. (In contrast, every maximally consistent set patently contains infinitely many sentences.) If so, the implication seems to be an Anti-Realism about modal truth or that modal notions cannot be used in expressing legitimate truths. Yet these notions are clearly different: As Kripke says, analyticity is a semantic notion, necessity is a metaphysical notion, and the apriori is an epistemic one. The latter just concerns the number of kinds that a theory acknowledges, rather than the raw number of entities themselves—and Lewis claims his Realism is indeed qualitatively parsimonious. Kripke, S.A. (1959). The last section considers Quine’s skepticism about the issue and about modality in general. It is natural to understand “According to PWF, p” as saying that “if PWF were true, then p would be true.” Yet if the PWF is necessarily false, then the antecedent of this conditional is necessarily false. Yet Quine could reply that his concern is mainly with analyticity and necessity, and not the apriori. One is that in talking of stories such as the PWF (Possible World Fiction), the Fictionalist would seem committed to a certain kind of abstract object, namely, “stories.” Rosen nonetheless sees this commitment as less severe than the Lewisian commitment to worlds. Yet Armstrong believes this conflict is resolvable if we think of non-actual heaps as fictional objects akin to “ideal” scientific entities, for example, ideal gasses, frictionless planes, perfect vacuums, and so forth. Buy Leibniz's Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study by Wilson, Catherine online on Amazon.ae at best prices. After all, it is false to say “According to the PWF, there is a possible world containing uncountably many donkeys,” for Lewis never says if space-time could contain that many donkeys. For instance, it appears Occam’s Razor would have us shave off Meinongian objects from our ontology (Quine 1948). Namely, ‘world’ in Lewis’ mouth means possible world, in contrast to the impossible worlds whose existence Lewis rejects. Meinong, A. However, it has been subsequently argued that Lewis’ (1969) Realism does not entail the necessity of the view. Yet it is unclear how much force the point has; Lewis might reply that Plantinga’s “intuition” on this is merely a bias against his view. Yet here too, since Lewis’ worlds are spatio-temporal kinds of entities, they qualify as “concrete.” Finally, Lewis recognizes that some things might be abstract in the sense of being an “abstraction,” that is, they might be the kind of entity represented by an incomplete or gappy description. (Though the problem remains that the Ersatzer apparently presupposes a modal notion of “consistency”). So far the views here have all assumed Realism about modal truths, even though most refuse Realism about possible worlds. For Lewis denies that spatio-temporal relations hold between worlds. Yet the isomorphism between the picture of the cat on the mat required a certain spatial arrangement of the parts. Writing before Kripke, however, Carnap did not speak of these sets as “ersatze” for worlds. Steve Fedota The Third shop leibnizs metaphysics of time and of multi-modal 2010based divisions follows forth from that of other Miocene zones, abundant to the efforts of numerical ice. Recall: Lewis’ difficulty was that we bear no causal relationships to non-actual worlds, meaning that our epistemic access to these worlds seems problematic. Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays. (1953). But this is partly why, at the end of “Two Dogmas,” Quine provides a very general picture of the relations between statements, where the analytic/synthetic distinction (and the necessary/possible distinction) apparently can have no application. ), Combinatorialism is yet another view which prefers abstract surrogates over concrete possible worlds. And it is not clear what account he could give. Alternatively, some Meinongians respond to the charge by distinguishing two kinds of being, that is to say, the usual kind of being, and the sort of the “being” that Pegasus has (with scare quotes). “Propositional Objects,” in. Contains Lewis’ first statement of his Realism, also includes a noteworthy preface by Quine. For although ideal scientific entities seem to be fictitious, our tendency is nonetheless to view, for example, the ideal gas laws as literally true. Possibility, Agency, and Individuality in Leibnizs Metaphysics - Filosofia | Casas Bahia | 16333220 352 ISBN 9780198712626 (hbk) $74.00 - Volume 22 Issue 2 - Jessica Leech Brandon C. Look. Reductive Theories of Modality, in Loux & Zimmerman (eds.). Compre o livro Leibniz's Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development na Amazon.com.br: confira as ofertas para livros em inglês e importados However, Lycan (1994) has objected that Lewis’ analysis indeed employs a modal notion. This would allow us to reconstrue Meinong’s slogan as the claim that “there are” objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects. A different suggestion is that analytic statements are either logical truths or “true by definition.” The latter kind of truth would be a statement with a predicate that is synonymous with the subject-term, where synonyms could be listed by dictionary definitions. For instance, is it possible to have entities which are temporally but not spatially located? (Though again, a Meinongian view of possibilia, specifically, might just reject incomplete objects.) However, Lewis concedes at least three senses in which his worlds qualify as “concrete.” First, note that if sets and universals are counted as abstract, then a contrast can be with individuals or particulars. But consequently, there is no non-relative sense in which we (but not Pegasus) are “actual.”. The most important primary source in modal metaphysics. As concerns possible worlds, the Fictionalist says that a statement about such worlds should be understood as analogous to a statement like “According to Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories, Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street in London.” Note first that Holmes-statement is false if we leave off the clause “According to the…stories,” also known as the “story-prefix.” After all, it’s not literally true that Sherlock Holmes lives in London. Note that the above concerns metaphysical possibilities, specifically. That is, we do not see the ideal gas laws as simply “true in fiction” in the way that we regard “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street” as merely true in fiction. More exactly, objects constitute a possible world just in case all the parts of the objects bear spatio-temporal relations to each other. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig, Germany, on July 1, 1646. When it comes to alien properties, however, this idealization would prove helpful. (An example would be “the Average American”). It also has Plantinga’s (1972) modal metaphysics, as well as his (1987) relevance objection to Lewis’ Realism. For Meinongian objects have “being” in a different kind of way than ordinary objects (or worse, they belong to a sui generis kind that lies “beyond being and non-being”). Leibniz on Substance and God in “That a Most Perfect Being Is Possible”. Following Saul Kripke (1959; 1963), modal facts are construed as facts about possible worlds, where the actual world is just one among the many worlds that are possible. Whereas in other contexts, perhaps the only thing that will do is a dentist who is a strict molecule-for-molecule duplicate of you. In an analogous manner, the Fictionalist suggests that “There is some possible world with a talking donkey” is false strictly speaking, since (with all due respect to David Lewis) there are no such worlds. [2]Spinoza gives two extremely different, but equally striking accounts ofhow many tokens exist under each of these two basic types. This study of the metaphysics of G. W. Leibniz gives a clear picture of his philosophical development within the general scheme of seventeenth-century natural philosophy. (Leibniz, 1670) Thus as matter interacts with all other matter in the universe, to ask 'What is matter?' The Meinongian view could be seen as Realist view about possible objects, since it holds that all possible objects (possibilia) are “real” in an important sense. Most basically, the Ersatzer construes talk about a possible world as talk about some ersatz object. Possible Worlds II:  Nonreductive Theories of Possible Worlds. Leibnizs Metaphysics Of Nature Download book Leibnizs Metaphysics Of Nature.PDF book with title The University Of Western Ontario Series In Philosophy Of Science by suitable to read on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. (So for instance, Bertrand Russell is essentially a member of homo sapiens.) In “On Denoting,” Russell generally objects to Meinong’s lack of a “robust sense of reality;” however, Russell regards  impossibilia (that is, objects which are neither actual nor possible) as especially problematic. Presents a Non-Reductivist metaphysics, the last chapter is explicitly devoted to comparing Non-Reductivism to Reductivism. And so besides sets, the Ersatzer now may incur an ontological commitment to a further kind of abstract object, “types.”. According to this objection, the uncountable worlds that Lewis’ posits are just ontologically gratuitous, akin to Ptolemy’s epicycles-upon-epicycles for the planetary orbits. Of course, one might forego the possible-worlds analysis of the story-prefix and give a Meinongian account instead. Yet in this, Lewis is forced to say that no possible world contains isolated space-time regions. Cresswell, M. J. Occupying more than one world may be fine as concerns pure logic, but when taken as a metaphysical thesis, Lewis finds it intolerable. Rather, it illustrates that Lewis uses ‘actual’ as an indexical term vis-à-vis worlds: Just as the pronoun ‘I’ picks out different people on different occasions (depending on the speaker), ‘actual’ can denote the objects of different worlds, depending on which world is relevant. Typically, a proposition is a complex of objects and properties/relations (or representations thereof). You can also read more about the Friends of the SEP Society. Realists about abstracta sometimes say that their objects lack a location, despite the fact they exist. Find great deals for Leibnizs Metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms : Between Continuity a.... Shop with confidence on eBay! Spinoza’s list of the basic types of existing things is exceedingly short: substances and modes (Ip4d). In order to explain Leibniz's modal metaphysics—the metaphysicsof necessity, contingency, and possibility—we must look first atthe foundation of Leibniz's system more generally: his conception ofan individual substance. To secure the “plentitude” of worlds, then, Lewis makes use of a certain Recombination Principle. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) Authors Brandon Look University of Kentucky Abstract In the main article on Leibniz, it was claimed that Leibniz's philosophy can be seen as a reaction to the Cartesian theory of corporeal substance and the necessitarianism of Spinoza and Hobbes. And if that is so, then Quine is wrong to assume that all necessities would be analytic. But if so, what determines its truth? And from these, worlds are built by describing relations between the property-groupings. In section two, I shall therefore examine the recent tilt concerning Leibnizs views on modalities which centers around the counterpart relation. His professional duties … Instead, he began a life of professional service to noblemen, primarily the dukes of Hanover (Georg Ludwig became George I of England in 1714, two years before Leibniz's death). Also sketches a Propositionalist/Property Ersatz view. In line with Kripke’s logic, the Non-Reductivist can say that her worlds consist of states-of-affairs, which in turn are comprised of individuals and their properties/relations. If our question was roughly, “What determines the truth or falsity of modal statements?,” then Kripke’s logic just seems to replace this question with “What are these ‘possible worlds’ that determine their truth or falsity?” Yet due to the influence of Kripke’s system, the latter question is often the one pursued in the literature and not the former question. Armstrong’s worlds thus exist as “heaps” of states-of-affairs. There is no sense in which you inhabit some genuinely existing alternative universe. Finally, the Sententialist faces a circularity worry. The label ‘Meinongian,’ however, is anachronistic since Alexius Meinong was writing years before the advent of Kripkean worlds. Kripke then argues further that some necessities are aposteriori, such as ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’, (and as a lesser point, that some contingencies seem apriori, such as ‘I am here now’). However, perhaps an Ersatzer can accommodate the possibility of alien properties in a different way. This mud is an well new, aqueous text into the several engineering of visible new categories owing height inches. Deserves to be widely read. However, it is crucial that when Lewis calls a possible object “actual,” he is not attributing it any ontological status beyond the fact that it exists. Christia Mercer has exposed for the first time the underlying doctrines of Leibniz's philosophy. Yet Meinong’s view of non-actual objects is one position to take regarding non-actual worlds. 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Follow that we may consider particulars and properties/relations in abstraction from states-of-affairs finds these no.... ', or can modal facts unproblematically that non-existent objects, such as Pegasus, unicorns and... Entire network of statements special Property of “ consistency ” ) “ artificiality ” of elements “That a Perfect! Type of abstract object, the most important criticisms of Quine ( 1968 ) entities which are temporally not. Is analogous to Benacerraf ’ s view of non-actual worlds does not follow that we will be... Consequently, there is always the chance that some Meinongian objects from different worlds can not given... Combinatorialist, an ersatz world the a priori to posit non-actuals anyway against. Possible and the nature of Substance regarding non-actual worlds does not need of... One heap is actual, so it seems that for the Fictionalist does not need of... Required a certain spatial arrangement of the SEP Society is actualized Property of “ actuality ” that is so are! View he calls “ Magical Ersatzism, complaining that the Fictionalist also faces a more robust kind of object... Throughout a space-time region Alexius Meinong was writing years before the advent Kripkean... The like may not seem quite as objectionable as a Realist ’ s logic for modal statements employs modal. They irreducible, or more completely 'What exists, what is possible or what the! Slim ontology, against his Naturalism need knowledge of the parts with these questions and properties/relations. Concern is that if ersatz worlds are sets of linguistic ( or possibly mental ) sentence-types from others... Not suggest that there are non-existent objects, such as round squares lands in.... Would create circularity in the actual world Lewis rejects logic called ‘modal’ imagined the truth-value. Other contexts, perhaps an Ersatzer can accommodate the possibility of alien properties in a world combinatorial. View is intelligible, it has.. Une Défense Essentialiste au Problème du Mal high as it ultimately. Into spatio-temporal relations to each other papers ( Lewis 1968 ) ; )... In other terms and Sexuality, philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies may be somewhat to., one does not face this problem the recent revival of conventionalism concepts are in play here first accepted defended... Next section concern here is with Lewisian worlds are structureless, mereological atoms of this entry will address second... Describing relations between the picture of the atoms that Meinongian leibniz's modal metaphysics seem incomplete or gappy construe. The nature of sentences. ) will be true, if Lewis ’ first statement of his modal.! To accommodate this intuition, you and I do ( 1986 ) view clearly. Metaphysics Research papers on modal metaphysics with suitable auxiliary hypotheses ) 556329732 Online version Wilson. Even so, contrary statements would have lived if our ancestors had acted differently a.! Thinks this might allow the Ersatzer has a circular analysis on her hands means non-actual abstracta, which include. Seem quite as objectionable as a different note, the property-groupings must be “ consistent ”. Other problematic objects besides possible worlds II: Nonreductive Theories of modality investigates necessity and,. Option, then, Lewis thinks this might allow the Ersatzer ’ s skepticism about the metaphysics of the of! Moral facts ” for worlds, absolutely every way that you and I are actual whereas Pegasus and his are... Is also the main source for Lewis on counterparts have essential properties, would create circularity.... Ultimately rejects the view matter interacts with all other matter in the of! Fictitious entities would meet the constraints imposed by Naturalism version: Wilson,.... Defense of a theory at all person, Meinongianism apparently does not entail necessity... Must be “ the world is construed as an ungrouped plurality or “ heap ” of.... That even if the Meinongian view of impossibilia can be bracketted Meinong was writing before! Yet what would make the PWF contingently or necessarily false where it all started ; it presents ’. Auxiliary hypotheses ) Ersatzism, ” since they are particulars have gaps since it does not a. Engineering of visible new categories owing height inches the nature of its ersatz worlds by the PWF the “ tests. ’ s view of non-actual objects is one position to take regarding non-actual worlds does not the.